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it is not easy to identify the deﬁning elements of  post-Keynesian econo-mics. One might even argue that from a strictly theoretical and metho-
dological viewpoint, post-Keynesianism is not a ‘school of  thought’ in the 
proper sense. The Elgar Companion to Post Keynesian Economics is an ambitious 
attempt to explain both the coherence and the heterogeneity of  this theore-
tical approach to economics. 
In his introduction to this thematic encyclopaedia, John E. King describes 
post-Keynesian economics as resting on the principle of  eﬀective demand 
and on the related idea that there exists no automatic mechanism capable 
of  eliminating excess capacity and involuntary unemployment. These ideas, 
however, are also shared by the so-called bastard Keynesianism, methodo-
logically closer to neoclassical economics. In fact, King continues, it was as 
a reaction to this attempt at neoclassical vulgarisation – which implied a 
substantial degeneration of  John Maynard Keynes’ conception– that post-
Keynesian economics emerged as a distinct school of  thought in the 960’s. 
The fundamental role of  money, the inescapable uncertainty characterising 
economic activity and the importance of  expectations (stressed in particu-
lar by so-called fundamentalist Keynesians) appeared then as distinctive ele-
ments, besides the principle of  eﬀective demand, characterising post-Keyne-
sian economics.
However, even with this more precise characterisation, post-Keynesiani-
sm remains strictly interconnected with other heterodox schools. For in-
stance, institutional and Austrian economics insist on money, uncertainty 
and expectations as fundamental elements of  capitalism as well. King no-
tices also that propositions elaborated by Sraﬃans and Kaleckians, often 
presented as potentially incompatible, in fact constitute distinct streams of  
what today is post-Keynesian thinking. And for other aspects, according to 
Geoﬀrey Harcourt (987), Marxism, too, plays a decisive role in the birth 
of  post-Keynesian economics, through its inﬂuence on Michal Kalecki and 
Joan Robinson. On a theoretical level, the role of  money and the industrial 
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reserve army (which indicates that involuntary unemployment is an intrin-
sic condition in capitalism) are two remarkable examples of  the relevance of  
Marxian theory for post-Keynesian thought. 
As concerns policy, King explains that post-Keynesians show a general 
hostility towards neoliberalism and insist on the necessity of  state interven-
tion and active macroeconomic management. This position, of  course, is 
compatible with diﬀerent substantive theories. Post-Keynesian economi-
cs can then be understood as a broad label in which diﬀerent theoretical 
and methodological approaches coexist, and stimuli from other economic 
schools are positively developed.
This book on post-Keynesian economics gives the reader a unique op-
portunity to understand the diﬀerent lines of  development of  Keynes’ ori-
ginal vision directly from some of  the main exponents of  this school of  
thought. The book is part of  a more general project developed by Edward 
Elgar consisting in a series of  selective encyclopaedias by schools of  econo-
mic thought. The Elgar Companion to Post Keynesian Economics contains 80 
entries by 83 authors, which reﬂect the diversity existing within this school 
of  thought. The book, with its pedagogical and more technical entries, is 
appealing for both students and well-trained economists. Indeed, thanks to 
valuable eﬀorts by the great majority of  authors, even technical issues are 
made accessible to non-specialists while expert readers are directed towards 
other publications for more technical developments. However, I must also 
note that in some entries (though they may be few) too much is taken for 
granted. This is a shame, as readers interested in post-Keynesian economics 
have not necessarily read the works of  Keynes and the other founders of  
this economic School. Obviously, dealing with constraints on the length of  
essays is diﬃcult indeed in books of  this kind. Yet when graphs, equations or 
theorems are discussed, it would be useful to have them present.
The articles of  the book deal with some of  the central issues of  Key-
nes’ theory, the post-Keynesian critique of  neoclassical theories of  capital, 
growth and distribution, the relations with other economic schools or theo-
retical approaches (such as neoclassical economics and its developments, the 
new Keynesian economics, the Austrian School, the institutional School, 
Sraﬃan economics, Kaleckian economics, Kaldorian economics and Joan 
Robinson’s economics), questions of  economic philosophy, methodology 
and research methods, and some of  the most debated policy and political 
issues, which provide a rich and articulated picture of  post-Keynesian eco-
nomics.
In this essay, I will begin by reviewing the contribution of  the book in 
reproducing the heterogeneity characterising post Keynesian economics. In 
section , I will discuss the theoretical convergence of  post-Keynesianism 
and other heterodox approaches and, in section 2, I will focus on the main 
attempts to deﬁne the methodological traits underlying this convergence. 
The problem, in my view, is that the heterogeneity of  post-Keynesian eco-
nomics is largely the eﬀect of  some ambiguities in Keynes’ theory itself. I 
will then reconsider the ‘Keynesian revolution’ and its challenge to neoclas-
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sical economics on the grounds of  economic theory in section 3, and metho-
dology, in section 4. In section 5, given the importance of  policy issues for 
post-Keynesianism, I will discuss the attitude of  Post-Keynesians towards 
welfare economics and neoliberalism. ﬁnally, I will make some observations 
on the diﬃculties in deﬁning post Keynesian economics as a proper school 
of  thought within the heterodox camp.
. Post-Keynesianism and heterodox economics
Thanks to the careful work of  the editor, the fact that post-Keynesian eco-
nomics is not strictly deﬁned is the very strength of  this book. Indeed, this 
encyclopaedia is much more than a useful reference book ; it is also an orga-
nic work to be read in its entirety that clariﬁes the role played by post-Key-
nesian economics in the context of  heterodox economics. 
The discussion of  capital theory and the Cambridge controversies illu-
strate the commonality with Sraﬃan economics. Piero Sraﬀa’s 925 and 926 
papers contained a radical attack on the Marshallian method of  partial equi-
librium and helped develop ‘the imperfect competition revolution’, which 
constituted one of  the great theoretical innovations of  post-Keynesian eco-
nomics. His 960 book was a solid basis for a critique of  neoclassical econo-
mics (although, as Ben ﬁne notices in the entry on capital theory, this critique 
does not invalidate the whole of  neoclassical theory, but only the one-sector 
model) and a rehabilitation of  classical political economy, which inspired 
important theoretical developments within post-Keynesian economics. As 
Harcourt explains in the discussion of  the Cambridge economic tradition, Luigi 
Pasinetti’s Theoretical Essay on the Dynamics of  the Wealth of  the Nations is one 
of  the most systematic developments of  aspects of  classical and Keynesian 
theories. According to Gary Mongiovi, the author of  the entry on Sraﬃan 
economics, in the 970’s Sraﬃan economics was mainly regarded not only as 
compatible with post-Keynesian economics, but also as a branch of  it. Mon-
giovi recognises, however, that « by the end of  the 980s, […] this view had 
largely given way to the presumption that the two frameworks are distinct 
and, in at least some respects, incompatible » (p. 38). According to the au-
thor, there exist genuine diﬀerences in perspective but “there is no necessary 
incompatibility on methodological grounds between the post Keynesian 
and the Sraﬃan frameworks ; the two complement each other » (p. 32).
The entry on agency, by Edward McKenna and Diane Zannoni, is perhaps 
the best example of  the attempt to develop aﬃnities between post-Keyne-
sianism and institutionalism. The authors discuss a wide range of  themes 
that might be relevant for the development of  a post-Keynesian theory of  
agency : the relations between agency and structure, the process of  their 
reproduction and transformation, the rejection of  both methodological in-
dividualism and methodological holism, the conception of  the economy as 
an open system, the role of  habits, routines and customs and the stabilising 
role of  institutions and conventions in uncertain decision-making contexts. 
The analysis is further developed by Steven Pressman in his discussion of  in-
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stitutionalism. The author discusses four places in which institutions appear 
in post-Keynesian analysis : in the explanation of  consumption behaviours 
of  households, in the understanding of  investment decisions of  ﬁrms, in the 
explanation of  the unique role of  money in capitalist economies, and in the 
discussion of  the relative stability of  capitalism. 
The relationship with Austrian economics has much evolved since the 
time of  the open hostility of  the 930s between Keynes and Friedrich August 
von Hayek. The recurring themes of  radical uncertainty, historical time, ex-
pectations and institutions, and the related criticisms of  equilibrium method 
and closed systems of  thought demonstrate a methodological convergence 
between these two economic schools : notwithstanding the still existing re-
luctance of  Austrians to deal with mathematical concepts, it is clear that 
Austrian radical subjectivism implies non-ergodicity. The essay on the Au-
strian school of  economics by Stephen Parsons focuses on the attempt, by each 
school, to incorporate uncertainty into their respective economic theories. 
Parsons discusses some important diﬀerences between Hayek and Paul Da-
vidson, treated as spokespersons of  the two schools. According to Davidson 
(989, 468), « Austrian subjectivists cannot have it both ways – they cannot 
argue for the importance of  time, uncertainty, and money, and simultaneou-
sly presume that plan or pattern coordination must exist and is waiting to be 
discovered ». By following Hayek’s objection to rationalism, however, Par-
sons maintains that the same argument can be turned against Davidson. 
If  the economy is not at full employment and the government decides to 
intervene, it cannot rely on any policy framework that has proven to be 
eﬀective in the past, since, in an uncertain and transmutable reality, the past 
cannot provide any reliable guide for the future. Parsons’ conclusion is that 
an emphasis on uncertainty and historical time raises problems both for the 
Austrian (Kirznerian) assumption that market coordination can occur in the 
absence of  governmental intervention, and for the post-Keynesian assump-
tion that it can occur through government intervention. Notwithstanding 
these theoretical diﬀerences, according to Parson, the general conception of  
time, uncertainty, expectations and institutions suggest « that the possibility 
of  forging links between Austrian economics and post Keynesian economi-
cs appears very promising ... [and] that any disagreement between the two 
schools are merely cases of  ‘disagreement between friends’ » (p. 6).
In this ambitious work of  systematisation of  post-Keynesian economics 
within the heterodox camp, my sole remark is that perhaps the relations with 
Marxism might have been developed a bit more. Surely, Marxian themes of-
ten recur in the book : ﬁrstly, they emerge in the conception of  the economy 
as a monetary one (and the related question of  crisis and unemployment), a 
conception that, as Claudio Sardoni points out in his discussion of  Say’s law, 
is at the heart of  both Karl Marx’s and Keynes’ theories ; secondly, they play a 
decisive role in the axis of  research developed by Kalecki and Joan Robinson 
(commented by Jan Toporowski and Cristina Marcuzzo, respectively). But 
it is curious that among the most important heterodox schools no speciﬁc 
entry is dedicated to Marxian economics or to the radical school. Of  course, 
Are we all Post-Keynesians? 149
this is not to suggest that it is possible to make links between Marxism and 
post-Keynesianism. Geoﬀrey Pilling (986), for instance, strongly argues the 
contrary. The point is that important attempts have been developed in this 
regard. Considering that King is an expert of  Marx and radical economic 
thought, this ‘omission’ must be the result of  a careful decision that would 
merit a clariﬁcation.
2. Methodological advances
Beside the developments of  Keynes’ ideas in the domain of  economic theory 
and public policy, Post-Keynesians have tried to construct solid philosophi-
cal and methodological bases for these theoretical developments. These at-
tempts are partly complementary and partly antagonistic.
Post-Keynesian philosophers are united in adopting an open-system ap-
proach. Within this approach, however, three main perspectives can be 
identiﬁed : critical realism, a ‘Babylonian’ perspective and an ‘encompassing’ 
approach, associated with Tony Lawson, Sheila Dow and Davidson, respec-
tively. These perspectives have important diﬀerences and implications for 
research methods. One of  the most debated issues concerns the role of  eco-
nometric methods. As described by Paul Downward in his essay on econome-
trics, Lawson and Davidson cast serious doubts on the validity of  econome-
tric inference, whereas Dow accepts the utility of  econometric inquiry.
Critical realism has developed a deep philosophical criticism of  all at-
tempts to ﬁnd event regularities by econometric inferences. As Andrew 
Brown explains, in economic theory these attempts are mainly developed 
by neoclassical economics, which has its roots in the philosophical system 
of  positivism and which presupposes an ontology in which reality compri-
ses the constant conjunction of  atomistic events in a closed system. In this 
conception, theoretical explanations pass through the search of  event re-
gularities and econometrics plays an important role in ﬁnding and testing 
these regularities. According to critical realism, however, the social world is 
an open system. In the critical realist ontology, reality is stratiﬁed into three 
distinct domains. These are the domain of  actual events, the domain of  em-
pirical experience and sense impressions, and the deep domain, where cau-
sal relations are located. To explain a phenomenon, in this conception, is to 
. Pilling 986, ch.  criticises Keynes and post Keynesian economics from a Marxist per-
spective and maintains “that it is not possible to construct bridges between the political eco-
nomy of  Marx and that of  Keynes, as envisaged by Robinson and others”. His analysis focuses 
on the diﬀerent methodologies and general conceptions of  Marx and Keynes, on their choice 
of  economic categories and on their diﬀerent conceptions of  capital as a social relation in one 
case and as a variety of  things in the other (which also shows the distance between Marx and 
Sraﬀa). By criticising Joan Robinson, Pilling (986, chap. 2) claims that “it was precisely a view 
of  capitalism as a deﬁnite mode of  production, arising under deﬁnite historical conditions, 
which was missing in Keynes”. As far as the relationship between Keynes and the classical 
tradition is concerned, contrary to Jan Kregel and others, Pilling’s (986, chap. 3) position is 
“that at a fundamental level these two traditions have little in common and that Keynesian 
economics is, in the last resort, a continuation, under twentieth-century conditions to be sure, 
of  the vulgar tradition in political economy”.
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move from the actual-empirical domains to the deep one, i.e. to ﬁnd the cau-
sal mechanisms that govern the event or state of  aﬀair under analysis (this 
scientiﬁc process is called ‘retroduction’). The fact that the same mechanism 
might inﬂuence diﬀerent phenomena and that the same phenomenon mi-
ght be governed by a plurality of  mechanisms makes econometric inference 
inherently problematic.
Davidson’s scepticism about the use of  econometric tools is a conse-
quence of  his criticism of  the axiom of  ergodicity. Stephen Dunn’s paper 
on non-ergodicity explains the reasons why under non-ergodic conditions 
econometric inference makes little sense. The distinction between ergodic 
and non-ergodic processes also clariﬁes the post-Keynesian view of  time and 
uncertainty. Murray Glickman’s discussion of  uncertainty shows that on the 
ergodic assumption, history ultimately does not matter since the passage of  
time does not aﬀect the joint probability laws governing stochastic proces-
ses. In a world of  creative, crucial decision-making à la George L. S. Shackle, 
however, there is no reason to assume the existence of  ergodic processes : 
decision makers operate in an environment of  fundamental uncertainty in 
which forecasts cannot be derived from past data and in which their own 
decision will aﬀect future economic conﬁgurations even in the long run. As 
further discussed by John Henry and in his essays on time in economic theory 
and Donald Katzner in his essay on equilibrium and non-equilibrium, neoclas-
sical economics allows no place for time, understood as an historical, unidi-
rectional process. In a stationary state, novelty can occur but does not aﬀect 
the values of  variables under analysis. The notion of  time invoked in this 
case is that of  ‘logical time’. In contrast, historical time implies irreversibility 
and path dependency. As Davidson (99, 32) puts it, “economic decisions are 
made by human beings facing an uncertain and unpredictable future while 
they are moving away from a ﬁxed and irreversible past”. 
The Babylonian mode of  thought is directly commented by Sheila Dow. Like 
critical realists, Dow stresses the organic nature of  society. In her approach, 
however, evidence can be validly provided by a variety of  sources, of  whi-
ch econometrics is one. In mathematics, Babylonian thought is contrasted 
with the Euclidean approach : the former involves a range of  starting points 
for arguments, and thus a multiple derivability of  physical laws ; the latter 
deduces all arguments from a given set of  axioms. More generally, a Eucli-
dean mode of  thought is a closed system in which a single, formal, general 
system is built starting from given axioms. In a closed system all variables 
are pre-speciﬁed as exogenous or endogenous. Euclidean thought is also 
characterised by atomism : the theoretical system is built on the basis of  
the smallest units, which are independent of  one another and of  the system 
of  which they are part. In neoclassical economics these units are rational 
economic men. On the contrary, in a Babylonian mode of  thought reality 
is segmented in order to construct a range of  partial analyses, based on dif-
ferent chains of  reasoning. These chains of  reasoning might rely on argu-
ments of  diﬀerent natures ; one might rely on statistical analysis and another 
on historical research. The same economic variable might be exogenous in 
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one chain of  reasoning focusing on one segment of  reality, and endogenous 
in another chain focusing on a diﬀerent segment of  reality. Some strands of  
argument may refer to individuals and others to aggregates such as groups 
or social classes, since causal forces may act in either direction. 
The relationships among the approaches of  Lawson, Davidson and Dow 
are complex. As already mentioned, they share a conception of  the eco-
nomy as an open system. Some authors have made the case for a deeper 
compatibility among them, but even the three leading ﬁgures of  these ap-
proaches do not seem willing to leave their philosophical and methodolo-
gical diﬀerences behind. In any case, all of  their methodological characte-
risations of  post-Keynesian economics contribute to ﬁnding unity among 
the heterogeneous theories that compose this economic school. Davidson 
has played a central role in the development of  the post- Keynesian School 
as editor (together with his teacher Sidney Weintraub until 983, when the 
latter died) of  the Journal of  Post Keynesian Economics, and today is doubtless 
one of  the leading ﬁgure of  post-Keynesianism both on a theoretical and a 
methodological level. For her part, however, Dow suggests that Babylonian 
thought might be a way by which post-Keynesian economics can be identi-
ﬁed from a methodological viewpoint. ﬁnally, Lawson maintains that most 
key post-Keynesian elements, such as opposition to mainstream, emphasis 
on method, focus on uncertainty and history, upholding of  genuine human 
choice, and allowance of  competitive substantive perspectives, can be ren-
dered intelligible by critical realism and suggests that the heterogeneity cha-
racterising post-Keynesian economics can be made coherent if  grasped as 
being essentially a critical realist project.
All of  this demonstrates that the philosophical debate within post-Keyne-
sian economics is still open and that other steps forward are necessary. The 
search for a coherent philosophical and methodological unity, however, is 
itself  an important advance in the deﬁnition of  post-Keynesian economics 
as a School of  thought.
3. Mr Keynes and the classics
In the 930’s, when the General Theory appeared, Keynes’ theory constituted 
a radical challenge to the dominant view, based on Say’s law, according to 
which there cannot be any obstacle to economic growth deriving from an 
insuﬃcient level of  aggregate demand. Keynes’ fundamental teaching was 
that, in capitalism, there exists no automatic mechanism that ensures that 
the level of  output is compatible with that which sustains full employment. 
This conclusion ﬂows directly from the principle of  eﬀective demand, whi-
ch Keynes himself  considered as his crucial theoretical innovation. Con-
trary to neoclassical theory, which focuses on the price mechanism as the 
prime object of  enquiry, Keynes shifted his attention on the mechanisms of  
determination of  national income. In this sense, Keynes’ contribution con-
stituted a radical challenge to orthodox economics. Brought to its extreme 
consequences, the assumption that adjustments take place via quantities 
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and not via prices implied a rejection of  the whole neoclassical theory of  
value.
Keynes’ interventionism had little to do with the search for an eﬃcient 
allocation of  resources. Instead, the role of  the state was, ﬁrst of  all, to 
manage the overall level of  aggregate demand. In this light, Keynes sugge-
sted that forms of  socialisation of  investment and devices of  co-operation 
between public authorities and private initiative might be the means to pur-
sue full employment. Neoclassical welfare economics, based on the perfect 
competition model, had no role to play in this policy framework.2
This is not to say that Keynes’ policy prescriptions were revolutionary in 
substance. On the contrary, Terence W. Hutchison (968) shows that most 
economists in England, whatever their theoretical perspective, were oppo-
sed to wage cutting as a remedy for unemployment. Even Alfred C. Pigou, 
Keynes’ main target according to many historians of  economic thought, 
declared himself  in favour of  compensatory public spending and policies 
that we would today call Keynesian. Mark Blaug (985, 67-676) proposes a 
detailed reconstruction of  the dominant economic opinions before Keynes’ 
General Theory, in which he shows that, in the 930s, orthodox economists 
had no diﬃculty in explaining the persistence of  unemployment. It was also 
clear that government budget surpluses in both the United States and Bri-
tain had deﬂationary eﬀects and that monetary policy between 929 and 932 
was more often tight than easy. From a Marxist viewpoint, Pilling (986, ch. 
2) pushes the argument further by claiming that “the tenets of  the old libe-
ral neoclassical economics, and the corollary of  these tenets, laissez-faire 
as an economic doctrine, were under considerable challenge before The 
General Theory appeared”. Joseph Schumpeter (963, 76) summarises 
the trend in economic theory by noticing that “on the whole, the business 
class still had its way throughout the period, at least up to the beginning of  
this century … but its severe conﬁdence in the virtues of  laissez-faire was 
gone and its good conscience was going”. In other words, there was no lack 
of  explanations for the causes of  the Great Depression. The point is that 
these explanations were all ‘ad hoc’ and did not put into question the full-
employment implications of  orthodox theory. The General Theory was not 
revolutionary for its policy implications, but for its coherent systematisation 
of  policy issues.3 
However, partly for tactical reasons, partly because of  deeper theoretical 
2. There is no consensus on the role of  general equilibrium and perfect competition in Key-
nes’ theory. According to Leijonhufvud 976, 86-87, “the pre-Keynesian ‘neoclassicism’ from 
which Keynes sought to break away was not neo-Walrasian. … The analytical criticism and 
theoretical polemics in Keynes’ General Theory were directed against the Marshallian school in 
which he had been trained”. Blaug 976 openly disagree with Leijonhufvud and maintains in-
stead that Keynes leaned heavily on the concepts of  general equilibrium, perfect competition 
and comparative statics.
3. According to Blaug 976, 63, « the tendency of  economists to join the rank of  the Keyne-
sians in increasing numbers after 936 was therefore perfectly rational ; it was a switch from a 
‘degenerating’ to a ‘progressive’ research programme, which had little to do with contentious 
issues of  public policy ».
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convictions, Keynes did not propose his theory in open contrast to what he 
called the classical theory. In the General Theory, Keynes (936, 378) aﬃrmed 
that “if  our central controls succeed in establishing an aggregate volume 
of  output corresponding to full employment as nearly as is practicable, the 
classical theory comes into its own again from this point onwards”. This 
suggests that Keynes did not consider the ‘classical theory’ as simply wrong. 
Instead, he believed himself  to have put forward a more general theory, of  
which the classical theory was a particular case (occurring when, for some 
reason, the level of  aggregate demand happens to be compatible with full 
employment). In this sense, Keynes rehabilitated the idea that the price 
mechanism is an eﬃcient means of  allocation of  resources (even though it 
is insuﬃcient to determine an adequate level of  aggregate demand) and, in 
this, he rehabilitated orthodox economics.
This potentially contradictory position opened the way for a number of  
attempts of  theoretical reconciliation between Keynes and neoclassical or-
thodoxy. The IS-LM model, the introduction of  rigidities and imperfections 
in the general equilibrium framework and the distinction of  short-term and 
long-term models suggested that Keynes and neoclassicism are perfectly 
compatible. This view was surely not discouraged by the author of  the Ge-
neral Theory, who reacted to John Hicks’ (937) much celebrated paper “Mr 
Keynes and the classics” by aﬃrming that he “found it very interesting and 
really [had] next to nothing to say by way of  criticism” (quoted in Blaug 
976, 6-2). Instead of  superseding neoclassical theory, Keynes’ contribu-
tion ended up by extending it. The consequence was the opposite of  what 
Keynes believed : in this new interpretation, Keynes’ General Theory was no 
longer general at all and became instead a particular case (valid only in the 
short-run and under the assumptions of  market imperfections) of  a more 
general (neoclassical) model. 
Obviously, this reconciliation between Keynes and ‘the classics’ could not 
be free from policy implications. Once aﬃrmed that Keynes’ theory is valid 
only in the short-run and that unemployment depends on rigidities (usually 
located within the labour market itself ), Keynes’ advocacy of  state inter-
vention became just a particular response to a particular form of  unem-
ployment. But the general prescription was still based on the old conviction 
that laissez faire is the best thing to do (particular Keynesian cases apart). All 
this poses a problem for attempts to characterise post-Keynesian economi-
cs by contrasting it with neoclassical economics. Although post Keynesians 
strongly criticise all neoclassical ‘perversions’ of  Keynes’ original vision, the 
origin of  the problem is probably in Keynes’ theory itself.
4. The Keynesian scientific revolution
The relations between Keynes and neoclassical economics can be further 
clariﬁed by considering some signiﬁcant attempts to interpret the Keynesian 
revolution as a scientiﬁc revolution according to the canons of  philosophy 
of  science.
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Alfred W. Coats (969) maintains that the Keynesian revolution represents 
a paradigm-change in the sense of  Thomas Kuhn’s (962) Structure of  Scienti-
ﬁc Revolutions. According to the author, before the publication of  the General 
Theory, “economics [had] been dominated throughout its history by a single 
paradigm – the theory of  economic equilibrium via the market mechanism” 
(Coats 969, 292-3).4 Although the passage from classical political economy 
to neoclassical economics is often presented as a major theoretical revolu-
tion, it also involved important elements of  continuity : the idea that prices 
are the prime object of  inquiry, the role of  the market as the main regulating 
mechanism of  the economy, the idea that the market is self-regulating and 
that competition is the device through which it works. The Keynesian revo-
lution questioned all these elements.
Axel Leijonhufvud (976) is sceptical about the possibility of  interpreting 
the main ‘revolutions’ occurring in the history of  economics according to 
Kuhn’s scheme. The fact that terms such as ‘the marginalist revolution’, ‘the 
imperfect competition revolution’, or ‘the Keynesian revolution’ were coi-
ned well before the work of  Kuhn and that Kuhn himself  did not make any 
reference to these revolutions suggests that “there are no strong reasons to 
presume that our revolutions are of  the Kuhnian class” (Leijonhufvud 976, 
68). From a theoretical perspective, the problem is that Kuhn’s revolutions 
displace pre-existing orthodoxies permanently and deﬁnitively, which is not 
the case in economic theory. In this respect, the author prefers to follow, at 
least in part, the Methodology of  Scientiﬁc Research Programmes of  Imre Laka-
tos (977), which admits “the possibility of  reviving a programme tempora-
rily eclipsed by competition and the ‘rationality’ of  keeping degenerating 
research programmes alive” (Leijonhufvud 976, 85). With regard to our 
attempt to characterise the Keynesian revolution, however, Leijonhufvud’s 
position is not far from that of  Coats. In particular, he maintains that the bir-
th of  Keynesianism as a school of  thought involves above all a common vi-
sion, in Schumpeter’s sense, according to which the system does not usually 
work according to the mechanisms assumed by classical political economy 
since the time of  Adam Smith. To clarify this change, Leijonhufvud (976, 
87) introduces the term ‘coordination of  economic activities’. In the classical 
vision, the presupposition is that the market system is largely self-regulatory 
and self-organizing. The scientiﬁc problem lies in explaining the mechanisms 
that govern this apparently counterintuitive phenomenon. This raises scien-
tiﬁc questions such as : how is it possible that decentralised activities can be 
so reasonably coordinated ? How can a decentralised system work so well ? 
Keynes’ vision was rather diﬀerent. Keynes did not consider coordination 
failures as exceptions, and his attempt was precisely to explain the causes 
and remedies of  these generalised failures. Keynes’ scientiﬁc questions were 
thus of  the kind : how can the system fail to coordinate economic activities 
4. In a following work on the relations between economics and psychology, Coats 976, 44 
follows Lakatos’ methodology and aﬃrms that the latter “is assuredly more promising than T. 
S. Kuhn’s suggestive ‘structure of  scientiﬁc revolutions’, which was too rigid and monolithic 
in its original form, and in subsequent versions seriously lacking in precision and speciﬁcity”. 
Are we all Post-Keynesians? 155
to such a great extent ? How can a centralised intervention improve this lack 
of  coordination ? What economic policy might be the most adequate to this 
end ? This change of  perspective was the essence of  the Keynesian revolu-
tion for Leijonhufvud. 
John Hicks (976) also suggests that scientiﬁc revolutions in the social 
sciences have a largely diﬀerent signiﬁcance compared to revolutions in the 
natural sciences. The problem is that social reality is not permanent or re-
peatable as natural reality. Changes in systems of  thought in the social scien-
ces are often caused by the need to accommodate new facts that come into 
existence in the course of  history. Economic theories are necessarily partial 
and selective in the sense that they shed light on some aspects of  reality by 
leaving the rest in the dark. Often it is because of  external events that the fo-
cus of  economists shifts from one type of  representation to another. These 
shifts, however, are never deﬁnitive, and ‘old’ scientiﬁc questions can arise 
again in ‘new’ circumstances. In the case of  the Keynesian revolution, Hicks 
stresses the particular economic circumstances of  the 930’s. According to 
the author, Keynes’ contribution belongs essentially to the domain of  mo-
netary economics. The necessity of  stabilising the system by means of  poli-
cy instruments is a consequence of  his monetary conception of  capitalism. 
This view was not original ; indeed, it was held also by Ralph G. Hawtrey 
(99), to which Keynes’ (930) Treatise was largely directed. The main diﬀe-
rence was that Keynes had a more up to date perception of  the industrial 
system, according to which the long term interest rate was the crucial ﬁnan-
cial variable, not the short term rate, as assumed by Hawtrey. The diﬃculty 
in controlling the long rate was the main reason why Keynes “moved away 
from monetary methods to the ‘ﬁscal’ methods which have later been so 
largely associated with his name” (Hicks 976, 27). It was this historical cir-
cumstance that made him shift towards ‘ﬁscalism’. At other times, however, 
“one can … be fairly sure, from a general knowledge of  his work, that he 
would have reacted diﬀerently” (Hicks 976, 27). Hicks’ conclusion is that 
Keynes’ teaching is not in his particular prescriptions of  policy, but in his 
historical conception of  capitalism instability, which implies that policy in-
struments must be adapted to the changing conditions of  the time. 
Blaug’s position is articulated. Although critical of  Kuhn’s methodology, 
he aﬃrms : “if  economics provides any examples at all of  Kuhnian ‘scien-
tiﬁc revolutions’, the favourite example seems to be the Keynesian revo-
lution” (Blaug 976, 60). The author suggests, however, that it is Lakatos’ 
methodology that better applies to the history of  economics. Within such a 
methodological framework, his characterisation of  the Keynesian research 
program is straightforward. Keynes’ really novel aspects are to be found ) 
in the tendency to work with aggregates (departing from the ancient prin-
ciple of  methodological individualism) ; 2) in the adoption of  a short pe-
riod context (abandoning the method of  long period equilibrium of  classi-
cal political economy) ; 3) in the assumption that adjustments come mainly 
through changes in output rather than in prices (revolutionising one of  the 
main scientiﬁc questions of  political economy) ; and 4) in the explicit consi-
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deration of  the possibility of  destabilising expectations due to his original 
conception of  pervasive uncertainty (which made rational economic calcu-
lation impossible). His conclusion is that “there is hardly any doubt, …, that 
Keynesian economics marked the appearance of  a new scientiﬁc research 
programme in the history of  economics” (Blaug 976, 62).
5. Welfare economics, economic policy and neoliberalism
Let me now go back to the ambiguous relationship between Keynes and the 
classics by focusing on the aspect that has become a major point of  contrast 
between them : the issue of  economic policy. Neoclassical economics has de-
veloped a sophisticated normative apparatus based on the notion of  Pareto 
eﬃciency, which is perfectly in line with its liberal vision. Keynesian policy 
prescriptions are developed on a diﬀerent conceptual framework, based on 
macroeconomic considerations, in which Pareto eﬃciency is not really an 
issue. Keynes’ interventionism ﬂows from his original interpretation of  the 
way capitalism works. The problem is that this change of  perspective in 
the ﬁeld of  positive economics has not been accompanied by a systematic 
criticism of  the principles of  welfare economics and by the development of  
alternative moral principles. 
Although Pareto eﬃciency is not a neutral concept, its advocates have 
claimed that it is ‘objective’ because its underlying value judgements are 
widely shared. Pareto eﬃciency presupposes three value judgements : ) that 
every individual is the best judge of  his own well being ; 2) that social welfare 
must be deﬁned only in terms of  the welfare of  individuals ; 3) that indivi-
dual welfares cannot be compared. Let me say a few words on the supposed 
neutrality of  these value judgements.
That every individual is the best judge of  his own well being is a value 
judgement that seems easy to accept. Things, however, are not so simple. 
The debates on abortion and euthanasia, and the right or prohibition to use 
diﬀerent kinds of  drugs are examples of  the moral problems involved in this 
value judgment. The principle that social welfare must be deﬁned only in 
terms of  the welfare of  individuals rules out any possibility of  discussing 
objective needs and universal rights, and is incompatible with any holistic 
conception of  society. Compulsory education, prohibition of  buying and 
selling human organs (even when this increases the utilities of  both sellers 
and buyers), limits on the duration of  the working day (even when it is the 
worker that demands more work) are all violations of  this principle. It is all 
but evident, however, that their abolition would meet with widespread con-
sent. That individual welfares cannot be compared is a principle that better 
suits the interests of  a rich man than those of  a poor one, those of  a healthy 
person than those of  a sick one. There is nothing neutral or objective in all 
of  this. These are simply the values of  ethical individualism, which are an 
integral part of  the ‘classical-liberal’ vision.5
5. For a critical discussion of  the passage from positive to normative analysis in neoclassical 
economics, see Hausman and McPherson 996.
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As Blaug (980) notices, it is indisputable that there is a theoretical jump 
from methodological individualism to ethical individualism : it is one thing 
to say that economic processes and states of  aﬀairs must be explained star-
ting from the individual, and another thing altogether to adopt the three 
value judgments commented above in the deﬁnition of  social desirability. 
Methodological and ethical individualism, however, form a coherent whole 
in the classical-liberal vision (which directly leads to political individualism, 
i.e. to the prescription that individual economic freedom must be the main 
objective of  political interventions) as soon as one recognises that they are 
both consequences of  a common conception of  reality in which individuals 
are the only real entities and collective phenomena are only hypothetical 
abstractions (ontological individualism). If  normative prescriptions based 
on the Pareto principle make any sense, it is only within this conception, a 
conception that presupposes individualism on both positive and normative 
grounds.
Paradoxically, Keynesians seem to be less interested in problems of  moral 
philosophy than neoclassicists. At least the latter explicitly deﬁne what is 
good and what is bad for society. Keynesians instead insist on interventioni-
sm but consider social desirability a trivial issue. Here, of  course, we must 
clearly distinguish post-Keynesianism from other developments of  Keyne-
sian thought, such as the new Keynesian economics. The latter explicitly 
accepts the methodology of  neoclassical economics and, with it, also ac-
cepts its underlying vision and value judgements. According to New Keyne-
sians, dis-coordination problems are identiﬁed with market failures, in the 
neoclassical sense, and need punctual interventions aimed at re-establishing 
Pareto eﬃciency. The notion of  Pareto eﬃciency is a-critically adopted as 
if  it were the only conceivable guide for economic policy. This is perhaps 
the clearest evidence of  the academic and cultural hegemony of  the liberal 
vision, which has imposed its values well beyond the liberal camp.
Within post-Keynesian economics, the principles of  neo-liberalism have 
encountered a stronger resistance. But the diﬃculty in ﬁnding any unity in a 
post-Keynesian approach to economic policy is that the concepts of  eﬃcien-
cy and optimality, and the related concepts of  distortions and market failures, 
have not been completely eradicated by the normative discourse. These con-
cepts have very precise meanings in the neoclassical framework, based on in-
dividualism, subjectivism and the liberal doctrine, but still need precise deﬁ-
nitions out of  such a context. When Post-Keynesians discuss unemployment, 
inﬂation, unequal distribution, instability or slow growth, it seems that these 
issues are self-evident problems that do not deserve any moral justiﬁcation. 
Yet consider unemployment, which is the economic problem par excellence of  
Keynesianism. Unemployment can be undesirable for very diﬀerent reasons : 
because it implies bad conditions of  life for unemployed persons, because it 
weakens the workers movement, because it implies a waste of  human re-
sources, because it puts in danger the stability of  the system.6 It goes without 
6. Of  course, with other value judgements, unemployment can also be innocuous or even 
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saying that the proper remedy depends on the reason why unemployment 
is considered problematic. For instance, if  reduction of  unemployment is 
to be attained by cutting wages, it is not obvious at all that workers will get 
stronger, nor that will they have a more decent life.
Also in this case the problem can be traced back to Keynes’ only partial 
rejection of  economic orthodoxy. In fact, his rejection of  laissez-faire was a 
pragmatic one and was not intended to question the individualist motive.
Whilst, therefore, the enlargement of  the functions of  government … would seem to a 
nineteenth-century publicist or a contemporary American ﬁnancier to be a terriﬁc en-
croachment on individualism, I defend it, on the contrary, both as the only practicable 
means of  avoiding the destruction of  existing economic forms in their entirety and as the 
condition of  the successful functioning of  individual initiative. 
(Keynes 936, 380)
With this same pragmatic approach Keynes (936, 264) also discussed the 
issue of  real wages : “a movement by employers to revise money-wage bar-
gains downward will be much more strongly resisted than a gradual and au-
tomatic lowering of  real wages as a result of  rising prices”. Keynes’ problem, 
in this passage, is not to ﬁnd acceptable criteria of  income distribution, but 
just to ﬁnd a ‘painless’ way to cut real wages. Without an open discussion of  
the principles of  social desirability, the risk is that a pragmatic approach to 
economic policy can at best rescue the capitalist system from its recurrent 
crisis. In doing so, however, it just enforces the values of  individualism on 
which capitalism is based. 
According to the last report by the International Labour Oﬃce, 2.8 bil-
lion people were employed globally in 2003, more than ever before. Half  of  
them, however, earned less than the equivalent of  two dollars a day, which 
corresponds to the poverty line according to international organisations (Ilo 
2005). The problem is neither that the system might be unstable (as Keynes 
teaches, crises start when the other part of  the population, the owners of  
economic resources, do not buy enough), nor that it might be ineﬃcient 
(poverty and eﬃciency are perfectly compatible). The problem is that .4 
billion people, even working, are trapped in grinding poverty. But without 
an explicit deﬁnition of  social desirability, such a problem cannot even be 
addressed.
6. Are we all Post-Keynesians ?
Let me now come back to the book that has inspired the present essay. My 
impression is that in the attempt to lend coherence to the richness of  this 
school of  thought, too much emphasis is put on elements of  convergence 
between heterodox approaches. At the same time, theoretical contrasts are 
developed mainly with respect to neoclassical orthodoxy, with no systema-
tic discussion of  the inﬂuence that neoclassical economics and Keynesian 
desirable. In an ultra-liberal conception, unemployment is harmless because, by deﬁnition, it 
is voluntary. For a Kaleckian capitalist it might even be good to the extent that it lowers the 
cost of  labour.
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economics have had on each other. Perhaps this is the eﬀect of  neoclassical 
hegemony, which pushes all sorts of  heterodoxies to form a common front 
against its dominance. As in politics, opposing parties search for their unity 
more in disagreement with the ruling coalition than in the development 
of  a common political programme. The problem is that these strategies 
rarely work in politics and make no sense in scientiﬁc research. Almost half  
a century after its birth, post-Keynesian economics remains a very appealing 
approach to economic theory. Yet it seems to still be in search of  its identity 
– theoretically, methodologically and ideologically, alike.
The Sraﬃan critique of  neoclassicism has surely much in common with 
Keynes’ theory. But as we have seen, the General Theory was not intended to 
discard the neoclassical model, but simply to generalise it. In its theoretical 
development, Sraﬃanism takes a very diﬀerent path with respect to post-
Keynesianism. The Sraﬃan model is a closed one. This is the consequen-
ce of  the scientiﬁc question posed, which has to do with distribution and 
conditions of  reproduction of  the economy. Money and eﬀective demand 
are not necessarily incompatible with the model, but it is the study of  the 
real economy and production that is the essence of  Sraﬃan economics. 
Coherently with the classical political economy, prices (of  production) are 
an essential aspect of  the inquiry. The method adopted is that of  the long 
period equilibrium, in which there is no room for radical uncertainty and 
non-ergodicity, and which does not presuppose any historical conception of  
capitalism instability. Post-Keynesians, such as Davidson, are sceptical about 
scientiﬁc enquiries developed by Sraﬃans and, as mentioned above, have 
tried to characterise post-Keynesian economics in terms of  its original con-
ception of  time, uncertainty and expectations.
This characterisation suggests that aﬃnities with Austrians might be 
more solid. However, under the surface deep theoretical diﬀerences remain. 
On a general level, the Austrian vision of  the problem of  coordination could 
not be more diﬀerent from the Keynesian one : self-regulating markets are 
necessary and suﬃcient to coordinate economic activities ; expectations are 
studied mainly within the presupposition that they are stabilising ; instabili-
ty is all but an intrinsic condition of  capitalism ; and even policy issues are 
far from being developed from a historical perspective (as laissez faire is the 
solution anyway). On a more speciﬁc level of  analysis, Austrian economics 
is based on radical subjectivism and methodological individualism and is 
characterised by a strong anti-empiricism. One problem that emerges is that 
with these premises Austrians have developed a deep criticism of  macroeco-
nomic aggregates, which are at the basis of  Keynesian analysis. Second, Au-
strian individualism is not merely a methodological choice ; it reﬂects an 
ideological vision and a political position, which form a coherent whole 
with Austrian economic theory.7 Without a deeper characterisation of  post-
7. I am not saying that the Austrian theory is coherent, but simply that its ideology, econo-
mics and politics are mutually compatible. My criticism of  Austrian neoliberalism is develo-
ped in Palermo 2004 and Gloria-Palermo and Palermo 2005.
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Keynesian economics, the risk is that the diﬀerence between the two schools 
is reduced to acceptance or rejection of  the principle of  eﬀective demand. 
I doubt, however, that modern Austrians would accept such a characterisa-
tion. After all, Austrians are ore united in their ultra-liberal vision than in 
their conception of  time, uncertainty and expectations.8 
The question of  methodological individualism also regards the relation-
ship with neoclassical economics. As a matter of  fact, the Austrian criticism 
of  macroeconomics does not spare its old ally of  the marginalist revolution 
either. In particular, the neoclassical synthesis, in its response to Keynesiani-
sm, has deviated from the original individualist programme and has accep-
ted the scientiﬁc validity of  macroeconomic aggregates. The paradox is that, 
in their attempt to distance themselves from all neoclassical degenerations 
of  Keynesian economics, Post-Keynesians have seriously downplayed one 
of  the great scientiﬁc successes of  the Keynesian revolution : the ability to 
impose its theoretical categories to mainstream economics. As Pilling (986, 
ch. ) notices, « it is not Keynesianism which has made unwarranted conces-
sions to the neoclassical orthodoxy but quite the reverse, the neoclassicists, 
by embracing the sort of  macro-aggregates which Keynesianism implied, 
have seriously compromised their principles ».
If  institutionalism and post-Keynesianism appear to be more compatible 
it is only to the extent that both of  them adopt suﬃciently general deﬁni-
tions of  their research programs, in terms of  cumulative causation, systemic 
vision, institutional factors and historical conception of  capitalism. At ﬁrst 
sight these formal commonalities might suggest that it is very easy to build 
bridges between these economic traditions. Without more precise deﬁni-
tions of  both institutional economics and post-Keynesian economics, howe-
ver, these bridges risk being constructed on foundations that are methodo-
logically too weak.
Finally, Keynesianism is associated with the necessity of  state interven-
tion. Yet also in this respect, it is not clear to what extent the variegated posi-
tions of  Post-Keynesians on actual policy issues are theoretically consistent. 
The entries of  the dictionary with a political character, such as competition, 
globalisation, third way, Tobin tax, transition economies and socialism are suﬃ-
cient to give evidence of  the diﬀerent positions coexisting within this school 
of  thought. Of  course, given the heterogeneity of  post-Keynesian economi-
cs, one cannot surely expect a uniﬁed position on issues that are at the centre 
8. Israel Kirzner and Murray Rothbard, two leading exponents of  this school of  thought, 
have very diﬀerent theoretical conceptions : the former has a conception of  equilibrium, un-
certainty and time that resemble very much the neoclassical one ; the latter faithfully follows 
Ludwig von Mises’ praxeological method and develops a conception of  uncertainty and time 
in open polemics with Kirzner. Both of  them, however, are united in strenuously defending 
the free market and laissez faire. According to Sandye Gloria-Palermo 999, Ludwig Lach-
mann, the most rigorous follower of  the founder of  the Austrian school, Carl Menger, and 
one of  the few Austrians to develop the case of  destabilising expectations, is often considered 
a dissenter, precisely because his open conception of  the economy does not lead to liberal 
conclusions.
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of  the political debate at many levels, from political parties to the no-global 
movement. Post-Keynesians are actively involved in these debates and their 
scientiﬁc inquiry is one of  the most important academic contributions to 
the discussion on the principles of  another possible world. The problem is 
that, too often, even within post-Keynesian economics, capitalism is taken as 
given and neoliberalism is criticised precisely in the name of  eﬃciency and 
stability, and on the implicit acceptance of  neoliberal value judgements. 
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